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Abstract:
Special legislation associated with mega sporting events has enabled new forms of cultural enclosure, effectively commoditising aspects of cultural expression that previously remained in the public domain. In this paper, the authors examine the tension between economic and political justifications for hosting the Olympics and the intellectual property enclosures that are imposed upon host nations. These enclosures extend beyond what is traditionally protected under trade mark law, to include ÔgenericÕ terms. Enabling market competitors to freely use generic, descriptive language is a core doctrine of trade mark law, seeking to balance monopoly IP rights with free market competition. The authors evaluate the impact of special legislative enclosures on the public interest, and argue that collective access to expression should be more carefully considered in political and economic calculations of the value of the Olympics.
Controversy over the value of hosting mega sporting events such as the Olympics has focused on whether public investment is justified or whether it represents an opportunity cost when expenditures elsewhere would better serve the public interest (Poynter, 2005; Baade & Matheson, 2004; De Nooij & Van den Berg, 2013) . Economic models applied ex-ante as justification for investment often depend on the concept of a Ômultiplier effectÕ which is expected to produce direct, indirect and induced stimuli at various points in the economy (Kasimati, 2003) . Arguments by proponents of hosting the Olympics have based their claims in part on the expected economic benefits to local businesses and residents. However, added to considerations about the worth of Olympic host status to nationsÕ economic and social welfare should be the effect of new legislative techniques which impose limits on the use of language and imagery related to the sporting event, beyond what would be protectable by traditional intellectual property law. Exceptional legislation limits commercial speech by local businesses and could be used to limit or censor unwanted expressions by other groups. As the Olympics and other mega sporting events have grown in importance as spectacular sites of symbolic capital exchange, the value of cultural signs and symbols related to the Games has increased. Efforts by Games organisers and sponsors to enclose and commoditise cultural expression through legal enclosures is consistent with intellectual property enclosure in other realms, but highlights a contradiction at the core of the modern Olympics movement: while the Olympics draws its strength from the participation of the public via expressions of patriotic nationalism, event organisers seek increasingly to exclude the public from access to the very same means of expression.
A number of authors have highlighted the ways in which the aims of cultural preservation, protection or promotion can be impacted in contradictory ways by efforts to enclose cultural symbols as intellectual property. Comaroff and Comaroff (2009) posit that efforts to commoditise local indigenous culture as a tourism ÔbrandÕ often has the perverse result of both materially preserving while simultaneously alienating creators from previous means of cultural production (2009:3) . Similarly the enclosure of culture may have alienating effects in other settings, such as that of athletic competition. Examining sporting mega events, Cho (2009) Paradoxically, however, the cultural expressions described by Cho and Tzanelli, through intellectual property enclosure, are either prohibited or are re-cast as a form of market consumption, rather than spontaneous expressions of sporting nationalism.
For example, the twin mascots of the 2004 Athens Olympic Games, Athena and Phevos, were closely modeled after Greek terra cotta statues from the 7th century BC.
However, the resulting character designs were the protected trademarks of the Athens Olympic Organizing Committee (ATHOC) and used in commercial licensing and sponsorship around the Games event. In this way, a symbol available to common uptake and reinterpretation by the public was forcibly removed from the cultural commons and exclusively propertised.
Commenting in the lead-up to the 2012 London Olympics, James and Osborn (2011) characterised the on-going tension between the cultural importance of the Olympics and its commercialisation as an international media event:
The Fundamental Principles of Olympism aim at, amongst other things, blending sport with culture and education, promoting a peaceful society and having respect for fundamental and universal ethical principles.
[É] however, the ever-increasing costs of hosting the Games requires the local organising committee to maximise its commercial revenues in order to put on a spectacle of sufficient proportions to be considered to be a success by the IOC and the worldÕs media. (2011:4) Despite opposition by some lawmakers and legal scholars, the trend in special legislation has continued to evolve toward strict enclosures of generic words and images associated with mega events (see Table 1 ). The 2012 London Games represented the widest enclosure of words and symbols so far in the history of the Olympics, including restrictions on combinations of words such as ÔsummerÕ Ô2012Õ
and ÔmedalsÕ, terms which would not normally enjoy protection as trade marks. Event organisers have argued that the purpose of enacting event-specific legislation is to raise capital needed to stage the events by offering greater protection to sponsors. Indeed, the London Games reportedly raised over £1.4 billion from sponsors who paid to have their brands displayed throughout the Olympic venue, as well as for rights to use official logos, words and imagery in advertisements (Rogers, 2012) . However, the total cost of the London Games was officially stated to be in excess of £8.9 billion (Gibson, 2012) .
The benefits to commercial sponsors and event organisers are potentially in tension with the public interest both economically and politically. National governments must justify public investment in mega sporting events to their political constituents. However, the true economic impact of a mega sporting event on a host country remains hotly debated, with no clear consensus on the net value of such an investment, nor on the appropriate method to empirically evaluate impact (Longdin, 2009; de Nooij & van den Berg, 2013) . Consensus about the reputational effects of place-marketing associated with media coverage of the host city or nation is similarly limited. Certainly, the enclosure of symbolic capital constituted by words and images associated with an event runs contrary to the economic rationale that local and national businesses will be able to fully benefit from a Ôtrickle-downÕ effect, since Olympics sponsorship attracts global brands seeking to reach an international audience. In this paper, we consider whether special legislation such as the 2006 Act should be understood in relation to existing theory on intellectual property enclosure.
We identify the features of the 2006 Act which set it apart from established trade mark law, and examine potential impact of those changes on the public interest.
Finally, the paper concludes by arguing that neither the public interest nor the interests of event organisers are secured by overly restrictive intellectual property enclosure. Rather a recognition of the co-constructed nature of cultural meaning is more consistent with the way that audiences, consumers, and publics engage with mega sporting events and the brands associated with them.
A second enclosure movement?
Since the turn of the millennium, numerous legal theorists have argued that a recent expansion of intellectual property rights should be likened in its effect to the enclosure of common land that took place in England between the sixteenth and the nineteenth centuries (Benkler, 1999; Boyle, 2003 Boyle, , 2009 Rose, 2003; Cohen, 2012) .
The argument has been forcefully made in the case of copyright law by Benkler (1999) but the issue has also drawn attention in the domains of trade mark and patent, notably in the life sciences (Heller, 2013; Torrance, 2013) .
According to Benkler (1999) Given these symmetric definitions [of the public domain], "enclosure" means a change in law that requires government, upon the request of a person designated as a right holder, to prevent some uses or communications of information that were privileged to all prior to the change. An "enclosure" moves some uses and communications previously in the public domain into the enclosed domain. (Benkler, 1999: 363) Boyle (2003) has carried forward work by Benkler and others to argue that the combined effect of new legislative protections on intellectual property across a range of domains constitutes not just a movement of certain goods into private hands, but a re-conceptualisation of the meaning of property. In this way, Ô [t] hings that were previously thought to be either common property or uncommodifiable are being covered in new or extended intellectual property rights. Õ (2003: 37) . According to Boyle, expansionist arguments in favour of extending intellectual property rights echo those that supported the privatisation of property in the first enclosure movement. Namely, that in order to overcome the Ôtragedy of the commonsÕ, inefficiently managed land should be transferred to the hands of a single owner, who will be incentivised to improve and tend the property. Selfish overgrazing will be replaced with longer term planning, resulting in an overall increase in productivity at the expense of increased inequality in the distribution of resources.
On the other hand, potential harms resulting from enclosure, both physical and intangible, historically included violence, dislocation, disruption of traditional social relations, and a changed view of the link between self and environment (Boyle, 2003: 35) . To that list Benkler (1999) adds the possibility that enclosure of intellectual property concentrates the production of information among fewer actors, to the detriment of political diversity. Boyle (2003) suggests that intellectual property enclosure creates perverse incentives on the part of information owners to politically mobilise in pursuit of protection of their new right. Further, intellectual property rights might be exercised improperly to censor or manipulate culture and cultural tastes; for example heirs of a famous author choosing to prevent adaptations and other uses seen to tarnish the original work. Discussing medical patents, Heller and Eisenberg (1998) argued that enclosure may actually invert the economic rationales provided to justify privatisation in the first place in what they refer to as the Ôtragedy of the anti-commonsÕ, a reduction of innovation brought about by the increased transaction costs imposed by proliferating private rights.
Critiques of the second enclosure movement concept have argued that drawing equivalences with the historical appropriation of real property is misleading or incomplete (Bowrey & Fowell, 2009) . It is true that intellectual property differs from real property such as land in a number of important respects. Unlike physical property, intellectual property is non-rivalrous: oneÕs use of the good does not deprive another of that use. Secondly, with the advent of the global information society, intellectual property is increasingly non-excludable, meaning that it is very difficult to prevent anotherÕs unauthorised use of the good as could be done with access controls on physical property (Rose, 2003) . as corresponding to a shift from material to symbolic production in the information economy (Harvey, 1989; Castells, 1996; May, 2014) . The increased proportion of wealth that is constituted by intangible property necessitates legal frameworks to commercialise cultural ideas and legitimate their trade. If, in 1978, some 80% of the market value of Fortune 500 firms was comprised of tangible assets and 20% intangibles, today the scales have tipped in the opposite direction, with 80% of the market valuation of large firms comprised of intangible assets, including trade marks and patents (Jolly, 2007; Brassell & King, 2013: 25) . The status of the Olympics as a cultural phenomenon has been no less influenced by the shift toward what Guy Debord termed the ÔspectacularÕ commoditisation of contemporary life.
Consequently, if the logic of intellectual property enclosure holds in the realm of international sporting events, we should not be surprised to observe the continuing trend toward granting exclusive property rights around these commercially valuable sites of cultural exchange.
In the next section, we outline the contours of existing trade mark law, and identify the points of divergence between its limited right and the new rights granted by special legislation including the London Games Act 2006. We argue that the special legislation enacted in the UK does constitute an enclosure according to the definition provided by legal scholars, in that it moves expression previously in the public domain into the enclosed domain.
Trade mark and special legislation
Trade mark law grants exclusive rights to use a mark in relation to a product or service. The mark designates the source of a good, and consequently must be unique, avoiding confusion with other competing goods or services in a specific market.
Trade mark is territorial, meaning that it is granted in a specific jurisdiction, and it protects a mark only in the class of goods in which the trader does business. For example, separate trade marks may be granted to Apple computer and Apple graphic design, as long as the marks are not applied to goods in the same class. Trade marks must be registered (in the UK with the Intellectual Property Office) and if granted, enjoy protection for a term of 10 years, which is renewable.
As with other intellectual property rights such as patent and copyright, lawmakers have circumscribed the rights granted by trade mark in order to strike a balance between the monopoly right of the mark owner and the interests of the public. In copyright and patent law, this balance is achieved partly by limiting the term of protection so that after a period of time, inventions and creative works enter the public domain, where they may be used freely as the basis for new creations.
Trade mark, if renewed, may last in perpetuity, so the exclusivity of the right is balanced instead by limiting the scope of the right to protecting only certain types of marks for specific classes of goods.
A foundational limitation imposed on trade mark has been that marks must be distinctive and not generic. Common words may sometimes be used as trade marks provided that their use is arbitrary, meaning that they bear no relation to the market or goods supplied (for example, ÔOrangeÕ for a mobile phone operator). The rationale for this limitation is that if generic words or symbols are monopolised by one single mark owner, it will limit the ability of competitors to market similar goods and services that can be described using the same generic language. The approach proposed by Litman is to limit the scope of protection granted by trade marks in recognition that brand goodwill is co-constructed by audiences and consumers and is therefore not solely the property of the markÕs user. The reputation, or ÔatmosphericsÕ which surround a brand are themselves a product. And if lawmakers wish to promote competition in the marketplace of ideas, Litman suggests that over-protection of those ideas is a misguided response:
The argument that trade symbols acquire intrinsic value Ð apart from their usefulness in designating the source Ð derives from consumersÕ investing those symbols with value for which they are willing to pay real money. [É] If the thing itself is valuable, if it is in some sense itself a product, then we want other purveyors to compete in offering it to consumers in their own forms and on their own terms. (1999: 1734).
LitmanÕs observations have proven prescient since, in the years following, the media itself has enthusiastically adopted characteristics of interconnectivity and coproduction. More than ever, through digital networks which enable user-generated content and audience contribution, brand value is inseparable from the communicative activities of consumers. Organisers of spectacular, global, televised events now seek ways to make their programmes more engaging and more ÔspreadableÕ (Ytreberg, 2009; Jenkins et al, 2013) . Hosting an Olympic competition in the era of digital media may necessarily mean relinquishing some measure of control over intellectual property to spectators and fans, whose collective engagement with the spectacle facilitates its circulation via participatory culture (Green & Erickson, 2014) .
Conclusion: the impact of enclosure on the public interest
The citizenry of the Olympic host nation is impacted by special legislation even though the commitment to enact such legislation occurs during the bidding process when there is limited public oversight or input (Scassa, 2012) . The host nation public is potentially impacted by special legislation in two ways. First, rules imposed by event organisers impose costs disproportionately on smaller local businesses which, according to commonly applied economic models of the potential benefits of hosting the Olympics, are the most likely to directly benefit from ÔmultiplierÕ effects as visitors and consumers spend money in the local economy. Paradoxically, any chilling effect produced by special legislation is likely to be most strongly apparent among smaller businesses which lack the marketing nous and legal understanding required to edge close to, without infringing, the labyrinthine set of regulations imposed (Scassa, 2012) . On the other hand, large multinational brands, wishing to generate associations with an Olympic event, can apply a range of creative approaches for doing so without directly speaking about the Games. For example, during the 2012 event, non-sponsor UK company Marks and Spencer ran a major print advertising campaign using the strapline ÔOn your MarksÕ which portrayed revelers engaging in a variety of garden party games, the scene framed with patriotic colors and flag pendants. None of the words or images used in the advertisement directly infringed the London Games Act, but the overall impression generated by the combination of elements was an association with the cultural context of the Games.
The campaign required creative skill and legal expertise that may be inaccessible to smaller firms, while the subtle association prompted by the advertisement may not have been suitable for those businesses directly engaged with customers, for example in the service or leisure industries.
Second, the public interest is potentially harmed by overly restrictive special legislation because it may impose a chilling effect on both commercial and noncommercial speech beyond the Games themselves. Granting exclusive protection for generic terms such as ÔsummerÕ Ô2012Õ and ÔLondonÕ raised challenges for nonsponsor advertisers while its usefulness to protect the investment of major brand sponsors is questionable. Importantly, the Olympics were not the only event which 
